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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, (administered by the 
Director of Finance) , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH 
and MARY MERKLEY 
SANDER, 
D.efendants. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10008 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
On the morning of August 4th, at approxim-
ately 9:40 A.M., 'Mr. Isabrand Sander was found 
dead in his automobile after it had crashed into 
an abutment on a 'bridge at 1135 West 4th South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 1.) On August 17th, 1962, 
a report of the accident was filed with the U tab 
State Industri~al Commission. ( R. 1.) Mrs. Mary 
Merkley Sander filed a dependent's application to 
settle the industrial accident claim with the Indus-
trial Commission on April 10, 1963 (R. 2), and 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hearings were held pursuant to the application un-
der the Workmen's Compensation Act on July 10, 
1963. 
On August 12, 1963, the Industrial Commission 
issued its order in the rna tter. The Commission 
f:ound in favor of the applicant: 
"The accident occurred at 4th South and 
1Oth West. This was no doubt the customary 
route to the West Side Office. I't was also 
customary for deceased to visit the West Side 
Office, not regularly hut certainly occasion-
ally on company business including Satur-
days. 
"Although we have no evidence other than 
custora, we believe that the evidenced adduced 
supports a finding that the deceased was on 
his way from the East Side Office to the West 
Side Office at the time of the fatal injury." 
(R. 97, '98.) 
'The State Insurance Fund applied to the In-
dustrial Commission for a rehearing of the claim 
on August 30, 1963. (R. 99.) The Industrial Com-
mission denied the application in an order dated 
September '23, 196'3. (R. 100.) The case has come 
to the Supreme Court after plaintiff's Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari (R. 101) was grante'd on the 17th 
day of October, 1963, and a Writ issued pursuant 
thereto. 
DISPOSI'TION SOUGHT BY THE 
DE:FENDAN·T -APPLICANIT 
The Industrial Commission and the deceased's 
widow, Mary Merkley Sander, ask 'that the Utah 
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Supren1e Court affirm the Order ( R. 97-98) of the 
Industrial Comn1ission which found that at the time 
of his death, Mr. Isabrand Sander was within the 
course of his employment and that his widow is 
therefore entitled to the benefits of the deceased's 
\Vorkmen's Compensation Insurance. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On Saturday, August 4th, the day of the iacci-
dent, Mr. Sander, as was his long-time custom, 
arose, washed, and dressed early in the morning 
before 7:00 A."M. (R. 48.) There was no indication 
that Mr. Sander was not entering upon his usual 
working day. He greeted his wife with the words, 
"Well, good morning." (R. 48.) After dressing, 
Mr. Sander went out the front door leading from 
his apartment a't 417 East Third South, walked out-
side to the front door of the apartment at 419 East 
Third South, (R. 29.) :and then went into his East 
Side Office which wws located in this wing of 1Jhe 
apartment house. In the meantime, Mrs. Sander was 
preparing breakfast. (R. 4~2, 49.) At about 7:30, as 
was customary ( R. 4·2), Mrs. Sander dialed the 
unlisted telephone number to Mr. Sander's East Side 
Office and notified him that breakfast was ready. 
( R. -!2.) Mr. Sander then returned to his residence 
at 417 East Third South by the same route ~and he 
and his wife a:te breakfast together. Mr. Sander 
did not converse with his wife about his proposed 
Itinerary for the day. It was not his custom to speak 
with his wife concerning his business affairs, (R. 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
50) . Mr. Sander was an extremely industrious, 
thrifty, energetic, hardworking, active and vigorous 
man ( R. 43, 44, 20) and was fully capable of taking 
care of his own affairs. (R. 50.) They never took 
very much time to eat because Mr. Sander was al-
ways in a hurry to get back to work. ''I would say 
maybe about a half-hour maybe, before he went back, 
I would say." (R. 49, '50.) 
This was the last time that Mrs. Sander or 
any ~other person to the knowledge of anyone saw or 
heard from Mr. Sander un'til the time of his instant 
death at 9 :40 A.M. caused by his automobile crash-
ing into an abutment 'On a bridge at 1135 West 4th 
South Street, Sa1t Lake City, Utah. (R. 1, 51.) This 
location was on the direct route which led f:rom the 
East Side Office of I. Sander, Inc. to the West Side 
Office. (R. 97.) Mr. Moulton, the executive vice-
president of I. Sander, Inc., was on his way to the 
West Side Office as he "came down" 5th South 
Street ~at about the time of the accident, and saw 
but did not recognize the crashed car of Mr. Sander. 
(R. 63-64.) 
As a general rule and habit, Mr. Sander would 
"return to his office immediately" after eating 
breakfast in his residence apartment. (R. 42, 61, 62, 
6'3.) 'This included Saturdays. ( R. 42, 20.) Other 
officers of the company were so certain that Mr. 
Sander would be in his East Side Office at 8 :00 
in the morning that they would occasionally call 
t!here for 'a conference with Mr. Sander 'at 8 :00 
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A.M. without even making prior arrangements or 
an appointment. ( R. 63.) Mr. Sander maintained 
extremely regular hours at his East Side Office. He 
could usually be reached at his office by telephone 
at any time of the day after 8 :00 A.M. (R. 68.) 
At a:bout 9 :30 on this Baturday morning, Mrs. 
Sander looked out the window and saw that her 
husband's Oldsmobile, the automobile in which he 
was driving when the collision occurred (R. 24.) 
was gone from the apartment. ( R. 51.) The com-
pany paid for the insurance on this automobile (R. 
22) and also for the gasoline, oil, 1and other auto-
m'Obile maintenance items which could be purchased 
on Mr. Sander's company service-sta:tion credit card. 
(R. 2'2-23.) Mr. 8ander used this particular Olds-
mobile on company business most of 'the time, tal-
though he also owned a Lincoln Continental. (R. 
34-35.) 
Mr. Sander periodically visited the West Side 
Office to check records, have stenographic work 
done, and hold consultations, ( R. 17, 54.) Often he 
would not phone or make arrangements in advance 
- he would just drive 1down. ( R. 54.) Mr. Sander 
had been working on a promotional device. The 
device worked somewhat like a slot m·achine, and if 
three markers came up the same, the customer would 
get his gasoline free. (R. 17-19.) Mr. Sander had 
a model of this device with him in the trunk of his 
car when he was killed. ( R. 1'8.) Mr. Sander was 
aware of a pressing company problem about a ser-
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vice station option and highway-access rights at a 
location in Fillmore. ( R. 32-34.) There is not one 
scintina of testimony or evidence in the en tire record 
tha:t Mr. Sander was at the time of his death doing 
anything else but going from his East Side Office 
to his West Side Office. 
ARGUMEN'T 
POINT ONE 
THE FINDING OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
BION THAT THE DECEASED ISABRAND SANDER 
WAS WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS E'M'PLOYMENT 
.A:T THE TIME OF THE FATAL 'COLLISION IS 1BASED 
ON SUFFICIENT, COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The question to be decided in 'this case is wheth-
er or not there was 'Sufficient, competent evidence 
to support the finding 1and Order ( R. 97) of the 
Industrial Commission that Mr. Isabrand Sander, 
at the time of his death, was within 'the course of 
his employment. Plaintiff contends that there was 
''no competent evidence to support the Industrial 
Commission's finding . . . " (Brief, p. 5.) If the 
Oommission based its Order ' ( R. 97) on any com-
p~tent evidence whatsoever, the commission's award 
should be affirmed. 
It mU'st be firmly stated and constantly kept 
in mind that, "To accomplish its salutary purposes, 
the [Workmen's Compensa:tion] Act should be liber-
ally construed in favor of coverage of the claimant." 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
12 u~tah 2d 2'23, 225, 364 P. 2d 1020 (1961); Looser 
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v. Industrial Commission, 9 Utah 2d 81, 83, 337 P. 
2d 965 (1959). 
In Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 5'5 Utah 
213, 184 P. 1020, (1919), the Utah Supreme Court 
overruled a decision of the Industrial Commision 
denying an award, where the issue was whether or 
not the employee was within the course of his em-
ployment: 
" ... Whether a particular injury is occasion-
ed by an accident arising out of the employ-
ment may present a more or less perplexing 
question, and with respect to which reason-
able men may differ . . . " 
"We are reminded that our statute requires 
that 'the statutes of this state are to be 'liber-
ally construed with a view to effect the ob-
jects 'Of the statutes and to promote justice." 
"We are all united upon the proposition that 
in view of the purposes of such acts, in case 
there is any doubt respecting the right to com-
pensation, such doubt should be re'Solved in 
favor of the employee or of his dependents 
as the case may be." (55 Utah ·213 at pages 
216-2'18.) 
In order to further this salutary purpose of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act, the rules of evi-
dence before the Commission in its hearing are much 
more liberal than those which prevail in the courts 
of law. Section 3'5-1-88, U.C.A. ( 19'53) provides: 
"Rules of evidence before commission. The 
comission shall not be bound by the usual com-
mon law or statutory rules of evidence, or by 
any technical or formal rules or procedure, 
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other than as herein provided; but may make 
i'ts investigations in such manner as in its 
judgment is best calculated to ascertain the 
substantial rights of the parties and to carry 
out justly the spirit of this title." 
The Court commenting on substantially the 
same section in Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial 
Commission, 102 Utah 4'9'2, 132 P. 2d 3'7'6 (1942) 
stated that the section 
". . . plainly changes the rule of evidence 
within the Act . . . Much could be said in 
favor of a thesis that the Commission could 
,act and base an award upon any kind of evi-
dence; that since the Act authorizes the Com-
mission to receive hearsay evidence, and there-
fore an a ward may be based thereon. * * *" 
(102 Uta:h at page 498.) 
The next step in procedure in a Workman's 
Compensation case, af.ter the Commission has made 
its finding and published i'ts Order, occurs if either 
party to the action appeals the Commission's deci-
sion. Here again, great weight !and scope of author-
ity is given to the decision of the Industrial Com-
mission. 
". . . (B) elieving the facts as related by the 
applicant widow and her witnesses . . . is a 
prerogative reserved to the Commission, with 
which we do not interfere short of arbitrary 
action not based on competent, believable evi-
dence. * * *" John G. Hendrie Company vs. 
Industrial Commission, T2 Uta:h 2d 80, 81-82, 
3'62 P. '2d 752 (196'1). See also, inter alin, 
J.B. and R.E. Walker, Inc. v. Industrial Com-
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mtSswn, 7 Utah 2d 132, 3'20 P. 2d 6'50, 651 
(1957). 
" ... (T)he Commission's findings are bind-
ing on this Court unless it can be shown as a 
matter of law that they are so unreasonable 
as to be arbitrary or capricious. * * *" Hol-
land v. Industrial Commission, 5 Utah 2d 
105, 106, 297 P. 2d 2'30. 
" ·It was not in tended . . . that this court, 
in rna tters of evidence, should to any extent 
substi'tute its judgment for the judgment of 
the commission.' * * *" Lorange v. Industrial 
Commission, 107 Utah 261, 264, 152 P. 2d 
272. 
With this background of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act's purpose, the procedure in i'ts hear-
ings, and the rules for appellate review, let us pro-
ceed to the evidence in the case at bar. Plaintiff 
contends that the deceased, Mr. Isabrand Sander, 
"was in substantially a 'retired' status" at the time 
of his death. fBrief, p. 5) This statement is in direct 
contradiction to the testimony of every witness who 
testified at the hearing. (R. 16, 3'3, 40, 4·3, 4'9, 50, 
54, 68, 69.) 
Plaintiff next contends that the office which 
I. Sander, Inc. maintained at 419 East 3rd South 
was not an office at all. On cross-examination, Mrs. 
Sander testified that this office had never been used 
for residential purposes since 1950. (R. 45.) Mr. 
Sander never slept in this office. ( R. 52.) Plaintiff 
contends that Mr. Sander could devote as much or 
as little time as he wished to company affairs in 
this office, and that he did not have to punch a time 
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clock. That Mr. Sander did not punch a time clock 
is irrelevant - very few executives do. What is 
extraordinary concerning Mr. Sander in 'this re-
gard is the regularity of hours which he kept in his 
East Side Office, far more regular, we might dare 
say, than the hours of most company presidents. 
Conferences were held in the East Side Office regu-
larly. (R. 17.) Mr. Nelson, a company employee, 
testified that " ... usually any time we'd want to 
con'tact him (Mr. Sander) we would call his office 
and contact him." '(R. 6'9.) As to conducting "per-
sonal affairs" (Brief, p. 6) in his office, besides 
the :Dact that most executives have occasion to con-
duct some personal business in their offices, Mr. 
James Moulton, executive vice-president of the com-
pany, testified that to his knowledge Mr. Sander 
in fact had very little personal business at all to 
perform. "When he was awake, he was either work-
ing or churching." (R. 60.) 
The uncontradicted evidence cle'ar ly establishes 
proof the company had an East Side Office and a 
West Side Office and that Mr. Sander's regular 
desk was in the East Side Office although he used 
a 1ta:ble for a desk at the West Side Office ( R. 1'1, 
12, 56) when necessary. The company paid the tele-
phone bill at the East Side ~office. (R. 12.) There 
was a logical business reason for maintaining a sep-
arate office on the e'aS't side of town : the office was 
near the offices of Standard Oil, which was the 
main customer of I. Sander, Inc. (R. 16.) 
10 
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There was not one iota of testimony from any 
of the witnesses tha:t the East Side Office was ever 
used by Mr. Sander for anything but business pur-
poses. There was a bed in the office kept there for 
emergencies when the apartment clientele might 
have more guests than they could accommodate, but 
Mr. 'Sander had never slept there. (R. 52.) 'There 
was no extension telephone be'tween Mr. Sander's 
office and his apartment. · ( R. 42.) I. Sander, Inc. 
paid the entire telephone bill for the office at 419 
East Third South. There is no evidence whatsoever 
in the record that the Company paid the telephone 
bill for the 'telephone in Mr. Sander's residence 
apartment, as i:t did in his office. 
M'ail was regularly addressed to I. Sander, Inc., 
419 E·ast Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah, the 
East Side office of I. Sander, Inc. ( R. 32.) Mr. 
Sander was paid $1000 per month as president. Mr. 
Hosford, the present president does not appear from 
the record to be pa.ying the rent out of his s'alary 
as president. He is paid $100.00 per month less 
than Mr. Sander, $900.00. In sum, this is the office 
which the plaintiff terms Mr. Sander's "den". 
(Brief, P. 6.) The above brief recital of facts inci-
dental to the East Side Office shows 'the faUacy of 
this term - in rac't, judging from the testimony of 
Mr. Sander's widow and business associates, Mr. 
Sander's character was such that he might have 
found great difficulty in finding a use for a ''den" 
for "serious or frivolous pastimes." (Brief, p. 6.) 
11 
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Plaintiff admits that Mr. Sander was in "Apt. 
14" between 7:00A.M. and 7:30A.M. on the morn-
ing on which he was killed. (Brief, p. 10.) Plaintiff 
infers that this did not necessarily place Mr. Sander 
within the course of his employment, in that we do 
not know for an absolute fact that Mr. Sander did 
any work while he was in Apt. 14, the East Side 
Office of I. Sander, Inc., between 7:00 and 7:30 
A.M. This contention is directly contrary 'to the rule 
set forth in Edward v. Industrial ·Commission, 87 
Utah 127, 130, 48 P. 2d 45'9: 
"'As stated in Wheeler's Case, 181 Me. 81, 159 
A. 331, fue 'test is not so much 'as to whether 
the employer owns or controls the place where 
the injury occurred, but rather, whe'ther it 
happens on the premises where the work is to 
he performed. Ordinarily where an employee is 
present at the place of work, even though he 
has not started work but is there to begin 
work or is there on the premises on his way 
to perform his duties, the accident is compen-
sable. This is on 'the theory that 'the course of 
His employment must start somewhere. When 
he arrives at the place of work, the course of 
his employment begins." See also Bountiful 
Brick Co. v. Giles, ~276 U.S. 1'54, 72 L.Ed. 
507, 48 S. Ct. 221, Affirming, 68 Utah 600, 
'251 P. 5·515. 
Assuming Mr. Sander was reading the news-
paper in his office at 7:00A.M., and further assum-
ing arguendo that s~aid reading had nothing to do 
with his course of employmen't (which is unlikely 
in the case of a presi1dent of 'a petroleum distribut-
12 
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ing company), if, as the Commission found as a 
fact, Mr. Sander was in his office and this office 
was his place of work, he had embarked on the course 
of his employment. 
Having disposed of some of the less significant 
arguments advanced by the plaintiff, it is ~appropri­
ate that we advance to the very crux of this case : 
vVas Mr. Sander in his course of employment when 
he was killed? The question presents no hard ~and 
fast means of solution, since Mr. Sander did not 
live to present testimony, nor did Mr. Sander set 
out in writing or orally state his proposed schedule 
for the day. However, this same problem has pre-
sented itself to the Supreme Court of thi'S State 
and the courts of several others states, and an equit-
able method has been stated for resolving this prob-
lem. 
In the case of Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial 
Commission, 102 Utah 492, 132 P. 2d 3'76, Justice 
Larson initiated his discussion of the case with a 
question similar to that above, and then proceeded 
to reason forth the 'solution: 
"Does the evidence justify a finding that de-
ceased, on March 24th, while in the course of 
his employment at the boring machine, bump-
ed his head? There is no testimony of any eye-
'Lcitness to the bump, and deceased made no 
report thereof to the management of the em-
ployer. * * *" (102 Utah 4'92 at page 497.) 
"Much could be said in favor of a thesis that 
the Commission could act and base an award 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
upon any kind of evidence ; . . . The difficulty 
in proving the cause of death or of any injury, 
where the person injured dies as 'a result 
thereof, has long been recognized. * * *" (Id. 
at 'Page 49'9.) 
'QThe question is whether there is any evi-
dence, competent in a Court of law which 
when supported and corroborate dby the hear-
say evidence, justifies or sustains the find-
ings of the Commission. * * *" (Id at page 
502.) 
The Court then discussed the n'a ture of this 
"competent" evidence. Like Mr. 'Sander, the deceas-
ed in the Ogden Iron case (Id at page 502.) went 
to work on the morning of h'is accident. Just as Mr. 
Sander ''customarily" dr'ove down to the West Side 
Office on Saturdays ( R. 51) and "as a general rule 
and habit" returned to his E'ast Side Office imme-
diately after breakfast (R. 4!2), so in the Ogden 
I ron case there was testimony that " men . . . fre-
quently bumped their heads on the lever or the 
rail; ... " (102 Utah 4'92, 502.) 
After di'Scussing several other facts which the 
Court deemed significant, none of which were con-
clusive, the 1Court concluded: 
"We are not prepared to say that the Com-
misssion could not, from these facts infer and 
find that the bump on the head was received 
while a:t work at the boring machine ... " 
(Ibid.) (Emphasis added.) 
The Court affirmed the award of the Commission. 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A very similar problem was presented to the 
Supreme Court of Utah in Salt Lake County v. ln-
dustl'ial Commission, 101 U·tah 167, 1'20 P. 2d 321 
( 1941). The deceased died of Rocky Mountain spot-
ted fever. He had been working for the County in 
the canyons clearying brush, but of course the ticks 
which cause the disease 1are found not only in the 
canyon during working hours, but throughout the 
entire intermountain area at all hours. Justice 
Wolfe in this case characterized the facts as being 
in near "equipoise." The only evidence that the de-
ceased had contracted the disease while in the course 
of his employment was that he had said that some-
thing had bit his finger a few days before his death 
while he was working and four witnesses testified 
to the actual presence of ticks at a point 'three miles 
from the place the deceased had been working. In 
affirming an award of the Commission, the Court 
stated: 
"There is nothing appearing of record which 
is intrinsically discrediting to the uncontra-
dicted testim'Ony of the witnesses nor is such 
testimony wholly from interested witnesses. 
Further, the evidence as appears in the record 
not only carries 'a measure of conviction' to 
the reasonable mind, but is sufficient to throw 
the mind off equipoise, raising the inference 
that the deceased picked up the tick in the 
course of his employment. * * *" (101 Utah 
167 at page 1713.) 
The applicant..:defendant submits that the con-
sistent, uncontradicted, and overwhelming testi-
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mony of the witness in the case a:t bar concerning 
the unusually strong and long-standing habits and 
customs of 'the deceased was sufficient evidence to 
"throw the mind off equipoise, raising the infer-
ence that the deceased [was] in the course of his 
employment." (Ibid.) 
The C'ase of Dole v. Industrial Commission, 115 
Utah 311, 204 P. 2d 462 ( 1949) indicates the ex-
tent to which 'the Utah Supreme Court has liberally 
interpreted the Workmen's Compensation Act in 
order to accomplish its ''salutary purpose." In this 
case, the Industrial Commission had denied plain-
tiff compensation for injury to his eye on the grounds 
that the 'plaintiff had not suffered the accident as 
he claimed, or that there was niQ causal connection 
between the !accident and the injury. The Supreme 
Court annulled the order of the Commission and 
gran ted the a ward, stating: 
~''If the rule announced in the Smith case were 
'to be extended to the facts in this case, then 
an in'jure'd employee who could not produce 
witnesses to the accident might be denied 
recovery. The only important 'Similarity in the 
facts of the two cases are that in both in-
stances the employer was alone a't the time 
the claimed accident occurred, and, hence, had 
exclusive knowledge as to whether or not the 
accident happened. * * *" ( 115 Utah 311, 
314.) 
The court then proceeded to poin't out the ''con-
sistent acts and conduct of this plaintiff." (Id. at 
page '315.) 
16 
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Justice Wolfe dissented, and wrote a long opi-
nion based largely on a policy of upholding the de-
cision of the commission : 
" 'The findings and conclusions of the commis-
sion of questions of fact shall be conclusive 
and final and shall not be subjeCt to review; 
such questions of fact shall include ultimate 
facts and the findings and conclusions of the 
commission. * * *" (I d. at page 324.) 
The same sense of justice •and ·equity which in-
duced the 'Court to go so far as to vacate the 'order 
of the Commission denying compensation in the Dole 
case 'Should prevail in the case at bar. In this case, 
we do not have an "injured employee who could 
not produce witnesses to the accident ... " (Ibid.) 
'Ve have an employee who was killed almost instant-
aneously but who regul~arly, customarily, and ha!bi-
tually went to his East Side Office before breakfast 
at a·bout 8:00A.M., (R. 41, 42, 44), ·an employee in 
a collision while on a route which would have taken 
him directly from his East Side ·Office to h'is West 
Side Office at the time of '9 :40 A.M., a trip which 
he customarily made on Saturdays. (R. 46.) In 
essence, annulment of this claim would serve to ex-
clude from the provisions of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act all persons who hold positions which 
allow and require that they decide for themselves 
where and when their services are best needed in 
the interests of the company. There is always the 
possibility 'that the employee was in fact on person-
al business at the time he was instantaneously killed. 
17 
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He might even keep a log book of whence he was 
coming and whither he was going, but to no avail, 
for these would be mere self ..~serving declarations, 
or as p'laintiff terms it ''hearsay." (Brief, p. 20.) 
The case of l(;ahn Bros. Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 75 Utah 145, '283 P. 1054 (19'29) i1lustrates 
the indisputable rule that when an employee travels 
from one situs of employment to 1another situs, and 
the purpose of traveling is substantially that of ful-
filling a mission of the employer, the employee is 
within the course of employment. In the Kahn Bros. 
case, the Supreme Court upheld an award of the 
Commission to an employee who was doing the type 
of traveling mentioned. 'The applicant went to his 
office in the morning, just as Mr. Sander did in 
the case at bar. 
'':On the day of the accident, [after leav-
ing his office] , Doe visited the bank, made 
his deposit, ate his lunch at home, and had 
proceeded from his home toward the post 
office, when struck by an automobile ... 
He was then on his way, by the most direct 
route, to the po:st office, for the purpose of 
collecting the company's mail. * * *'' ('75 Utah 
1'415, ~47.) 
'' ... [W]Ihere an employee, either on his em-
ployer's or his own 'time, is upon some sub-
stantial mission for the employer growing out 
of his employment ... , the employee is within 
the provision of the act. 'The mission for the 
employer must be the major factor in the 
journey or movement and not merely inci-
dental thereto ... From the undisputed evi-
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dence we are of the opinion that the applicant 
was, while on his way to the post office, in 
the performance of a special mission for his 
employer. He was doing the errand he was 
directed to do. He resumed the purpose of 
his employment when he left home bound for 
the post office and the other offices where 
His business called him.'' (Ibid.) 
The evidence in the case at bar is indisputable 
that Mr. Sander did in fact go to his East Side Of-
fice at about 7:00 A.'M. on the date of his death 
(Brief, p. 10), thus entering upbn his course of 
employment (Edwards v. Industrial Commission, 
supra) just as Mr. Doe entered upon the coure of 
his employment when he began work at Kahn Bros. 
in the morning. Like Mr. Doe in the Kahn Bros. 
case, Mr. Sander interupted his work for a few 
minutes to come home and eat breakfast with his 
wife at 7:30A.M. '(Brief, p. 9.) After Mr. Doe ate 
lunch, he began walking towards the post office as 
he customarily did for the purpose of picking up the 
company mail. Of course, Mr. Doe was not struck 
by an automobile while the mail was being handed 
to him. There is no evidence in the case that he told 
anyone on this particular occasion that he would 
pick up the mail after he had eaten lunch. It is 
possible tha:t he was not going to the post office a;t 
all - on this one occasion he might have decided 
to go downtown and do some shopping for himself. 
But just as surely as the Court in the Kahn Bros. 
case would not indulge in such speculation, so the 
Commission has not so speculated in the c'ase at bar. 
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Mr. Sander was just as punctilious and regular in 
returning to his office after breakfast as was Mr. 
Doe in going to the post ofice to pick up the com-
pany mail after lunch. ( R. 4'9-'50, 4!2, 63.) For the 
same reason that the Court found that 'Mr. Doe 
was in the course of his employment when struck 
by an automdbile, the Commission found that Mr. 
Sander was within the course of his employment 
when driving from his East Side Office to his West 
Side 'Office. (R. 97, 98.) 
Plaintiff has not presented even a different 
theory of what the deceased might have been doing 
a:t the time of his death, although even the wildest 
theory would have been admissible before the Com-
mission in view of the liberal rules regarding he'ar-
say. 'The plaintiff in effect is saying: "You can't 
prove what the deceased was doing for one hour 
and forty minutes. We don't know either, but since 
you can't prove what he was doing for the hour 
and forty minutes, the Court must say that the 
Commission erred 'an1d that the deceased was not 
within the course of his employment when he was 
killed." If this view were to be taken by the Supreme 
Court, it would be all but impossible for the depend-
ent of an executive to receive Workmen's Compen-
sation benefits if the executive were instantly killed 
in an automobile accident. Such an interpretation is 
manifestly contrary to the intent of the Legislature 
in extending the salutary benefits of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act to executives, and contrary to 
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the liberal interpretation which the Court has long 
given to the interpretation of the Act in favor of 
compensating the dependents 'of a deceased employee 
and in upholding the decisions of the Industrial 
Commission. 
In Peterson v. Industrial Commission, 1U2 Utah 
175, 129 P. 2d 563 (1942), the Supreme Court vac-
ated an order of the Industrial Commission denying 
compensation to the dependents of the deceased. The 
Court discussed at length the rules to be applied in 
examining evidence presented to the Commission 
when the Commission's order is appealed, and one 
quotation which the Court made is especially per-
tinent to the case at bar: 
[In Kavalinakis v. Industrial Commission, 67 
Uta!h 174, 246 P. 698], Justice Frick on page 
181 of 67 Utah, on page 700 of 24'6 P. put it 
thus: 
" "The commission may not, without any 
reason or cause, arbitrarily or capriciously 
refuse to believe and to act upon credible evi-
dence which is unquestioned and undisput-
ed.'" (102 Utah 175, 178.) 
The problem of the difficulty of proving wheth-
er an employee of a company who has considerable 
if not total freedom in his methods of carrying out 
his duties for 1ilie company :and who is killed instant-
aneously in an automobile collision has not been a 
problem for the Utah Supreme Court alone. 
The case of Greenwald, Inc. v. Powdermaker, 
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Md., 183 A. 601 (1936) is extremely similar to the 
case at bar in facts, procedure, and reason'ing. Ex-
tensive quotation from the case seems in order in 
view of the striking simi'larities : 
"In 'this workmen's compensation case, the 
'claimant is the widow of Louis Powderm!aker, 
who was killed, on May 29, 1'933, in a coliision 
between his automobile and :a street railway 
car on Liberty Heights Avenue in Baltimore. 
At the time of the accident and for many 
years, Mr. Powdermaker was employed as a 
salesman by Greenwald, Inc., in its business 
of selling meat to retail dealers. lt was his 
duty to visit such dealers and obtain orders 
for meat to be thereafter delivered. In that 
service he used his own automobile. Accord-
ing to the testimony in the record, he would 
customarily call upon prospective customers 
during the forenoon and then return to his 
home, where he would communicate by tele-
phone with his em player's office to learn the 
exact price quotations for the day and also 
telephone customers in continuing and com-
pleting his sales negotiations. It was while he 
was homeward bound, about half past 11 
o'clock in the morning, which was the usual 
time of his return with a view to using his 
telephone for the purposes just indicated, that 
he became involved in the accident which 
ended his life. The cla:im of his widow under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act ... was 
sustained by the State Industrial Accident 
Commission, and its decision was affirmed, 
on the appeal of the employer and insurer, by 
the court of common pleas of B'attimore dty. 
On their further appeal to tlris court, the prin-
cipal question to be determined is whether the 
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e'l.'idence has a legally sufficient tendency to 
prove that the accidental and fatal injury to 
the claimant's husband was suffered in the 
course of his employment. * * *" (183 A. 
601, 602.) (Emphasis added.) 
There follows excerpts from the testimony of 
both the deceased's wife and 'adult son concerning 
the customs and habits of the deceased in his work-
ing activities, which the court introduced as follows: 
"The testimony of the claimant as to her hus-
band's customary activities as a salesman for 
Greenwald, Inc. was in part as follows: * * *" 
(lbid.Q) (Emphasis added.) 
"An adult son of Mr. Powdermaker thus de-
scribed His father's business habits as !a sales-
man for Greenwald, Inc. * * *" (Id. at page 
603.) (Emphasis added.) 
The court continues: 
"The employer and insurer produced testi-
mony from which it could he inferred that 
Mr. Powdermaker's last business transaction 
on the morning of the accident was the collec~ 
tion of rent from the tenants of two houses 
which he owned, and that he was proceed-
ing from one of these houses to his own home 
when he was fatally injured. * * *" (I d. at 
page 603.)' 
How similar is this to the statement in plain-
tiff's brief, pages 10-11: 
"'There is also a lack of any competent evi-
dence to prove what Mr. Sander might have 
been doing after he finished eating his bre'ak-
fast and ?efore the Oldsmobile. he was driving 
crashed 1nto the concrete bndge later that 
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morning. With such l:ack of proof, any find-
ing or inference wHich the Industria1 Com-
mission might make, to the effect that after 
his breakfast Mr. Sander went back to Apt. 
14 and then later went from there to the 5th 
South office, is clearly unsupported by com-
petent evidence." 
However, the ·Maryland Court continued: 
"But it is inferable from the other evidence 
in the case tlrat he had been engaged during 
tha:t morning in the performance of his sales-
manship duties, including collection of account 
of sales, and was driving to his home with a 
view to serving further the objects of his em-
ployment by the use of his telephone at the 
period of the day when he customarily used 
that method of promoting his employer's busi-
ness. 'The commissi'on and the jury conclud~d 
from the evidence in the record that 'the claim-
ant's husband, after deviating temporarily 
from the course of his employment in order 
to make his rent collections, ha:d resumed his 
service to the employer when he was proceed-
ing homeward for the purposes of the com-
muniac'~ions which were habitually necessary 
in his s:ale operations." (183 P. 601, 603.) 
This is very similar to the facts in the case at 
bar. It is ''inferable" tha:t when Mr. Sander went 
to his East office at 7 :00 A.M. that while there he 
was performing some type of work with1n the ambit 
of the duties of the president of a company. We may 
assume tha:t Mr. Sander was not within the course 
of 'his employment while a!t his residence apartment 
at 7 :30 A.M. to eat breakfast: he was "deviating 
temporarily from the course of his employment ... " 
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(Ibid.) A~~uming for the sake of argument that Mr. 
Sander did not return again to the East Side Of-
fie(', his work day had already begun, and when he 
was proceeding to the West Side Office, he ". . . 
ha:d resumed his service to the employer ... ," and 
was within the course of his employment when killed. 
The Court supra, proceeds: 
"In our opinion the evidence was legally suf-
ficient to perm1it the inference, actually drawn 
alike by the commission and the jury, that 
the claimant lost her husband in consequence 
of an accidental injury in the course of his 
employment. * * *" (Id. at page 603) (Em-
phasis added) 
" ... The objections to the testimony as to the 
customary routine of the claimant's husband 
in the perform'ance of his employment duties 
were also properly overruled." (Id. at page 
604.) (Emphasis added) 
In Brown v. R. J. Brown Co., Mo., 17'2, S.W. 
2d 645 ( 1943), the 'deceased was president of a 
wholesale dealership which handled "Pennzoil". 
Three days before the accident, deceased was told 
by his supplier to sell more ''Pennzoil." Deceased 
sold "Pennzoil" at three different spots on day of 
death, then traded his older car for a new one at 
7:00 P.M. He was driving alone on a highway 
which would h1ave taken him back to his own whole-
sale dealer's office. He was alone when killed when 
his car collided with a tree. He had not told anyone 
at his last stop exactly where he was going or what 
he was going to do. The collision occurred at 9 :15 
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at night. The Mo. Supreme Ct. upheld the decision 
of the Commission and the Mo. Cir. Ct. 11Jhat at the 
time of the <'ollision, the deceased was "in the course 
of employment" of R. J. Brown Co. (''Pennzoil") 
and his widow was thus entitled to the benefits of 
insurance taken out by R. J. Brown Co. for deceased 
under the Mo. Workmen's Compensation Act (simi-
lar to Utah's) . 
The finding of the Industrial Commission that 
the deceased was within the course of his employ-
ment at the time of the fatal collision is therefore 
based on competent evidence. The )Commission found 
tha;t the actions of the deceased on this particular 
morning, as far as they were directly observed, were 
perfectly consistent with Mr. Sander's customs and 
habits and the fact that he was subsequently flound 
dead in his automobrle on a route which would lead 
him to his West Side Office at 9:40A.M. 'The argu-
ments brought forth by plaintiff are in essence only 
wild theories, could..:have-beens, remote possibilities, 
but highly improbable. As the cases and the logical 
purposes of the Act show, it has never been the policy 
of 1the courts, nor does it appear to have been within 
the purview of the legislature, that well-founde1d 
claims sh'ould be defeated by a barrage of guesses 
about what could have happened. 
The case of Sylvan v. Sylvan Bros., 2:2'5 S.C. 
4129, 82 S.E. 2d 794 ( 19154) is cited by the plaintiff 
(Brief, pp. 15-1'6) as standing for the proposition 
of law that "Injuries sustained by executives who 
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slipped and fell on sidewalk on the way from home 
to place of employment. [etc., p. 16.] This case is 
clearly distinguisha:ble on its facts from the case 
at bar, and 'has been so explicitly distinguished by 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina in a more 
recent case. 
In the Sylvan case, "The claimant was in the 
habit of doing 'paperwork' including the prepara-
tin of advertisements, in his hotel room, which was 
his home at night, and when he fell on the street 
he ha:d in his pocket papers of the business upon 
which he had worked in his room on the night be-
fore." (82 S.E. 2d 794, 7'95.) In 1the ease at bar: 
1. The room in which Mr. Sander did his 
paperwork was not his '·'home." (Transcript, 
page 47.) The room which Mr. Sander use'd 
as his office, never had been his "home". 
(Transcript, pages 40-41.) 
2. There is no evidence in the Sylvan case, 
even had the claimant's hotel room been con-
si'dered an office as well 'as a home, that the 
claimant, Mr. Sylvan, actually did any work 
in that hotel room which would place him 
u•ithin the scope of his employment on the dtly 
and at the time he was injured. Mr. Sylvan 
himself was alive to testify that he did the 
paperwork in his hotel room the preceding 
night. In the case at bar, there is competent 
testimony to the effect that the 1de·ceased, Mr. 
Sander, went to his office at 7 :00 A.M. and 
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again at 8:00A.M. (R. 49), thereby entering 
upon the course of his employment, after 
which 1time he never departed therefrom until 
the time and place of the collision in which 
he was killed. 
In the Sylvan case, it is sta;ted: "Nor is it con-
tended that the corporation paid the room rent 'and 
made claimant's hotel room its p'lace of business." 
In the case a:t bar, Gregory Hosford, gene~al man-
ager of I. Sander, Inc. at 'the time of 'the death of 
the deceased, directly testified: "When we moved 
some of the office personnel from 419 East 3rd 
South to 181'5 West '5th South, we determined that 
we would maintain the office up there, and the ques-
tion of rent 'came up, and in discussing this with 
Mr. Bander he felt - and we felt along with him -
that the best thing to do was to compensate him in 
salary sufficient so that he paid the rent himself. 
* * *" (Transcript, page 10) (Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Hosford, the present president of I. Bander, Inc. 
is paid $900 per month. Mr. Sander, the deceased, 
was paid $1000 per month, the increase 'being an 
indirect means for the corporation to pay for the 
East 'Side Office. ( R. 15, 16.) 
The record in the case at bar, contrary to the 
Sylvan case, conclusively shows that the room at 
419 East 3rd South was the corporation's place of 
l>usiness. (R. 21-22.) 
In the Sylvan ·case, the opinion indicates that 
Mr. Sylvan had an office in his downtown depart-
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ment store, and that "the taking of the 'paperwork' 
to his room was, therefore, for his own convenience." 
( 82 S.E. 2d 794, 796.) Mr. Sander had no 
regular desk or place to work 'at his West Side Office 
(R. 56) and the maintenance of the East Side Of-
fice was not for mere conven'ience, but also because 
of its proximity to the offices of Standard Oil Co., 
I. Sander, Inc.'s largest customer (R. 76.) 
It should be further noted that all of the cases 
and texts cited in the Sylvan ca:se deal with the ques-
tion, undisputed in 'the case, of a pers'on who does 
work at home and is then injured while traveling 
to his place of business. The ·case at bar does not 
involve the question of Mr. San1der going from his 
home, where he did work, to his office. ·The Corn-
mission a:s triers of the facts found that the room 
located a:t 419 E'ast Third South was in fact the 
"East Side Office" of I. Sander, Inc. ('R. 97.) 'There 
was no finding in the Sylvan case th'at the hotel 
room in question in that case was found by the com-
mission to have been Mr. Sylvan's "office". It would 
have been "arbitrary and capriici1ous" for the Com-
mission to have found in the case at bar that I. 
Sander, Inc. did not in fact maintain two offices, 
especi:ally when sound business rea:sons were testi-
fied to for so maintaining two offices. 
It should be further ndted th'at the Sylvan case 
contains a lengthy, well-reasoned, and well-docu-
mented dissenting opinion, in which Justice ·Taylor 
stated, inter alia, that the award should have been 
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affirmed because claimant " ... at the time of in-
jury ... was on his way from one place of business 
to the other within the purview of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. * * *" (82 S.E. 2d 794, 802.) 
The case of Halpern v. De Jay Stores, Inc., 236 
S.C. 587, 1'15 s.·E. 2d 2197 (T9'60) presents a factual 
situation more closely in point with the case 'at bar 
than did the Sylvan case. The issue in the case was 
the same as that in the case at bar: Whether the de-
ceased when killed in an automobile collision was in 
the course of his employment. 'Like the case at bar, 
the deceased reporte'd into his office in the morn-
ing. ''There was a credit manager of the store whose 
duty it was to collect de'linquent accounts. When he 
failed he turned the accounts over to the deceased 
manager who tried to make collections by personal 
visits to the debtors. This was the scope of 'the 1duties 
of his employment." (115 S.E. 21d 2H7, 2'9'8.) 
Like the facts in the case at bar, the case arose 
over a dispute whether a;t the time of the collision 
the deceased was on his own personal business or 
within the scope of the duties of his empl1oyment 
in going to the homes of delinquent debtors and at-
tempting to collect on the accounts. 
". . . The credit manager testified that the 
deceased, after verifying that the credit man-
ager would be in the store on that 'day, on ~he 
morning of the day of the accident took In-
formation cards of several delinquents and 
sa~id to the witness, 'Well, I think - I think 
maybe I'll get out a little bit ·an'd loosen up 
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my muscles, relax a bit * * * and (the de-
ceased said) in the meantin1 while I'm out 
I can attend to a few things * * * might even 
take to a run up to Chester.' The witness 
knew that the deceased had ~an acquaintance 
in Chester." (I d. at pages 298-29'9.) 
At the time of the accident, the deceased had 
passed the turn to the debtor's house by 1.2 miles, 
and was on the road, possibly headed toward Ches-
ter. The Court upheld the finding of the Commis-
sion that the deceased was within the scope of his 
employment, stating: 
"There was no name sign on the Camp Ground 
Road, where the deceased should have turned 
left on his way to the debtor's home, bu't only 
a small sign showing the number of this sec-
ondary road. There are many such roads in-
tersecting the Old Winnsboro Road to 'decen-
den t' s left as he traveled it." 
"In the face of these facts, it cannot be said 
that the conclusion of the Commission that, in 
effect, the deceased wa·s on his way to see the 
debtor, and not in route to Chester on a per-
sonal mission as contended by the appel'lants, 
was without evidence to sustain the finding. 
Possibly the deceased was on his way to Ches-
ter but he had not reached that point of de-
parture from his duties when he met his 
death, according to the information which he 
had in the store and in his pocket. The latter 
is rather strong evidence that he intended to 
attempt the collection of ·the delinquent ac-
count although he never reached the home of 
the debtor ... " (ld. at page 2'99..:300.) 
" ... Nor is Sylvan v. Sylvan Bros., 225 S.C. 
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4'29, 82 S.E. 2d 7'94 ... in point, there the 
employee was injured on a city street while 
en route to war k. (Ibid.) 
Again, plaintiff's entire argument regarding 
the case of Vitagraph, Inc. v. lndustrml Commission, 
916 Utah 190, 85 P. 2'd 601 (19138) (Brief p. 13) 
rests on the proposition directly contrary to the find-
ing of fact of 'the Industrial Commission : ". . . the 
deceased was on his way from the Eas't Side Office 
to the West Side Office at the time of the fatal in-
jury." In the Vitagraph case, supra, the court at 85 
P. 12d 601, 605 srta ted: '~This case to be compensable 
a:t a;ll must come within the exception that where 
the employee, either on 'the employer's or his own 
time, is upon some substantial mission for the em-
ployer growing out of his employment." The court 
concluded that there was no special mission: 
" ... In going to his home he was not on a 
mission or errand for his employer, nor was 
he performing a duty for his employer." (Id. 
at page 606.) 
In the case at bar, the deceased was not going 
from home to work or from work 'to home; rather, 
he was going from one office, one place of business, 
to another. To say that the deceased was not travel-
ing to the West Side Office for business reasons, 
within the course of his employment, would be com-
pletely contrary to all of 'the evidence relating not 
only to the deceased's business habits, but also to 
his partilcular character trait of industriousness. 
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What has been said concerning the V itagraph 
case applies equally to the case of Greer v. lndustrwJ 
Commission, 74 Utah 379, 279 P. 900 (Brief p. 15): 
the Greer case also presented the factual situation 
of an employee going on what he contended was a 
"special mission" from his place of employment to 
his home, not to another office of his employer, as 
in the case at bar. 
Again, plaintiff in his discussion of the case 
of Jllorgan v. Industrial Commission, 92 Utah 129, 
66 P. 2d 144 (Brief P. 16) and Goodyear Tire & 
Rnbber Co. v. Industroial Commission, 100 Utah 8, 
110 P. 2d 334 ( 1941), rests his entire argument on 
the assumption that the deceased in the case before 
us was travelling from his home to what plaintiff 
concedes may have been his Wes\t Side Office. Wheth-
er there was a "special mission" from home to place 
of business is the entire question in these two cases, 
not whether a trip from one situs of employment 
to another situs of employmen!t placed ·tfue party in 
question in the course of his employment. As Justice 
'Volfe stated in the Goodyear case in his concurring 
opinion, quoted by the plaintiff: 
"I hope I have shown tha:t the distinction 
sought to be made in the prevailing opinion 
. . . is not a tenable distinction when the two 
cases are viewed as they should he, that is, 
from the point of departure from the home to 
the place of business. * * *" ( 100 Utah 8 13~14). ' 
In commenting upon plaintiff's Point 2 and 
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cases cited therein, the following distinctions and 
dbserva tions seem pertinent. 'The appH1cant agrees 
fully with the statement quoted by defendant from 
the Wherritt case: "1The burden of proof is upon 
applicant to establish her claim for compensation 
... " ('Brief, p. 19.) In thaJt carse the Commission 
held that the applicant had failed in this burden. 
The Supreme Court merely refused 'to reverse the 
Commission's finding. The defendant-applicant in 
the case 'at bar has sustained !her burden of proof 
b~ejore the Commission, to which this quotation re-
fers. 
Plaintiff makes the general statement that all 
of the testimony in the case is ''hearsay". Defendant-
'applicant has 'analyzed case after case, analogizing 
the fact situations and the !testimony given in the 
case at bar, showing their similarities, pointing out 
exactly how evi1dence of a simiiar nature in other 
cases has been held sufficient rand competent to sus-
1~tain an award of the Industrial Commission. Plain-
tiff rests on a broad generalizaJtion. 
Plaintiff cites Fish Lake Resort Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 73 Utah 471, 275 P. 580 (1929) 
(Brief, p. 20) on h~arsay testimony. It should be 
noted that at least six witnesses testified in the Fish 
Lake case that the deceased was merely fishing for 
his own personal pleasure at the time of his death. 
No witnesses testified in rtJhe case at bar 1that de-
ceased was driving for pleasure. 
'The case of Scowcroft & Sons Co. v. Industrwl 
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Commission, 70 Utah 116,258 P. 339 (1927), (Brief 
p. 20) i'S not in point. The issues in this case were 
dependency and the amount of the :award, not course 
of employment as in the case aJt bar. 
Plaintiff's citation of Vecchio v. Industrial 
Commission, 82 Utah 12'8, '22 P. 2d 212 (1933) 
(Brief p. 20) is particularly interesting. In this 
case, 'the Commission denied an award to the appli-
cant, and the Supreme Court reversed the denial of 
compensation. The Court stated a:t 82 Uta:h 128, 136: 
"Assuming that all the testimony tha:t could 
be by any rule ·classed as hearsay is equally 
balanced by circumstances or selfserving and 
disserving statements, and what consi1dera-
tion, if any, may be given to such (and we 
think such testimony tends to support rather 
than to destroy the reasonable inference that 
logically and naturally results from the com-
petent evidence), we are of the opinion the 
inference is supported cle1arly within ·~he rule 
of Cudahy Packing Co. v. Brown, ... [61 
Utah 29, 2'10 P. 608 '(192'2)]" (Emphasis on 
first phrase in quotation added.) 
The Cudahy Packing Co. case, supra, which 
was followed in the Vecchio case, supra, in overrul-
ing a decision of the Commission denying compensa-
tion is directly relevant to the competence of the 
evidence upon which the Commission hase'd its deci-
sion in the case a:t bar, and whi·ch evidence ·the plain-
tiff assails. 
Defendantoo~applicant recognizes the fact that the 
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Supreme Court annulled the award granted to the 
applicant in the Cudahy Packing Co. case. Yet the 
rules of that case regarding the com pen tency of 
evidence given in proceedings of the Industrial Com-
mission, when the evidence is submitted to the Su-
preme Court for review, have been cited with ap-
proval in la1ter decisions. These rules regarding the 
competency of evidence plainly support 1fue compe-
tency of the evidence in 1fue case at bar. 
Before discussing the law enunciated in the 
Cudahy Racking case, it should be noted that the 
award of the Industrial Commission in that case 
was annulled because there was not even any evi-
dence from which the Commissi1on's could infer that 
the deceased even suffered a scratch causing blood 
poisoning, much less a scratch occurrin1g during tile 
course of his employment. The Court stated at 61 
Utah 29, 3'3: 
'~This court . . . is committed to the doctrine 
~hat facts may be inferred from the surround-
ing circumstances of any particul'ar case, and 
tJha:t the absence of direct testimony is not 
conclusive that an injury did not occur, but 
that the Commission ... has the right to make 
such reasonable inferences frbm the facts 
proven as in its)udgm~nt may be consiste~t 
wfth the contention of either party ... In this 
case, however, from the nature of the injury, 
there is nothing to establish the fact that the 
accident from which 1fue injury resulted oc:-
curred at plaintiff's plant. From the testi-
mony it might just as reasonably be inferred 
that ·1fue accident occurred at the home of the 
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deceased, or that it occurred on his way either 
to or from his work. No one saw the cut, if 
there UJaS a cut, or scratch upon the hand, 
fingers, or arm. In fact, it is not shown that 
one ever existed. Until some proof is adduced 
showing that an accident happened at the 
plant of the plaintiff or facts proven from 
which it can reasonably be inferred that such 
accident did happen at plaintiff's plant, we 
do not see how there is any substantial or any 
evidence [sic] save hearsay testimony from 
which the inference oan be deduced that death 
resulted from an accident in Vhe course of de-
ceased's em·ployment." 
Defendant-'applicant submits that in the case 
at bar there is evidence which satisfies what the 
Court in the Cudahy Packing case stated was laCk-
ing. 
In the case of Diaz v. Industrial Commission, 
80 Utah 77, 1'3 P. 2'd 307 (19'32), ('Briefp. 20) the 
Court was confronted with expert medical testimony 
concerning the cause of the death of the employee 
of ·fue mining company. The evidence in ·1ilie case 
is so dissi1nilar to that in the case at bar as to only 
obfuscate the issues. Defendant-'applicarrt su!bmirts 
that the Commissi'on's findings in the ease at bar 
were not only supported by c;'sufficient" evidence, 
but that plaintiff failed to adduce any contradictory 
legally competent evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant-applicant 
requests the Court to affirm the Order of the Indus-
trial Commission of the State of Utah granting 
Workmen's Compensation benefits to M~ary Merkley 
Sander, wi1dow of the 'deceased Isabrood Sander. 
Resp~tfully submitted, 
GEORGE C. MORRIS 
Attorney for Defendants 
914 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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